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Origin Myths:
Narratives of Authority, Resistance, Disability,
and Law

David M. Engel

Origin stories are a distinctive form of narrative. In their account of how
something "began to be," such stories connect past and present, clarify the
meanings of important events, reaffirm core norms and values, and assert
particular understandings of social order and individual identity. The parents
of children with disabilities tell strikingly similar origin stories about the day
their child was first diagnosed. Such stories not only explore the meanings of
a transformative event but also draw implicit connections between past encounters with medical specialists and present encounters with educational
specialists as mandated by an important federal statute. This article, based on
an ethnographic study of parents, children, and educators, traces the implicit
references in the parents' origin myths to a set of key oppositions that reflect
their experiences within the statutory framework of special education: cooperative versus unilateral decisionmaking, lay versus professional knowledge,
and authority versus legal empowerment. The article also compares the ways
in which law and myth address the conflicting perspectives of disability specialists and of the parents and children themselves.

I. "It Was a Tough Day"
What I have written here strains to be true but nevertheless is
not true enough. Truth is anecdotes, narrative, the snug
opaque quotidian.
-John Updike, Self-Consciousness: Memoirs (1989:246)

I

everyday conversation, the talk of parents of children

with disabilities circles back from schools, vacation trips,
friends, and neighbors to earlier experiences with educators,
psychologists, doctors, and lawyers. One story parents often
tell each other concerns the first such encounter, the moment
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they first learned that their child was "handicapped," the day
on which their lives veered suddenly down an unexpected path.
Parents tell these "origin" stories with heightened feeling: the
stories are laden with special meaning. And, despite enormous
differences among families and children, the stories are remarkably similar.' Consider, for example, the story told by
Christine and Robert Campo during a conversation with the
author (who is also the parent of a child with a disability):2

I

This article draws on an ethnographic study of children with disabilities, their
families, and the public school systems with which they dealt. The study was based
primarily on lengthy, loosely structured interviews, which were tape-recorded and transcribed. All quotations in this article are taken verbatim from these transcriptions.
There were about 140 interviews with parents, some of which involved the participation of the children themselves. The interviews were conducted in urban, suburban,
and rural settings in Western New York over a 15-month period in 1987 and 1988.
Participants for the parent interviews were selected in two ways. One group (38
families) was contacted through the United Cerebral Palsy Association (UCPA). These
were families whose children had attended the UCPA preschool program and later fell
under the jurisdiction of their school district's Committee on Special Education (see
discussion of the CSE infra). Of these families 10 were selected for frequent interviews
throughout the research period; 20 were interviewed at the beginning and end of the
study; and 8 were interviewed only once, because their children had just reached
school age at the end of the research period. A second group (19 families) was contacted through the Education Law Clinic of the School of Law, State University of New
York at Buffalo. The children in this group also had physical disabilities but had not
necessarily attended the UCPA preschool program. They were selected so that we
could obtain the insights of parents who had made the decision to seek legal assistance
in their dealings with the school system.
In addition to the parent interviews, 30 interviews were conducted with chairpersons and other members of school district Committees on Special Education in 18
school districts throughout Western New York. In a related study conducted by Susan
Weber, who was then my research assistant, every committee member in two selected
school districts was interviewed.
Because of the sensitive nature of these interviews, parents and educators were
promised anonymity. Names of parents and children in the article are pseudonyms. All
transcripts are on file with the author.
2 Recent literature on ethnography and cultural interpretation has critically examined the relationship between researcher and subject and the processes by which
researchers attempt to represent the words, experiences, and perspectives of those
they study (see, e.g., Marcus & Fischer 1986; Clifford 1988a). Being aware of these
concerns, I should make it clear at the outset that, in one sense, I am a member of the
group among which I did my research: I am the parent of a child with a physical disability, and my child attended the same UCPA preschool as did most of the children in this
study (although only a few of the children and parents in the study were known to me
before I began my research). I participated in conversations and listened to the storytelling of fellow parents for years prior to my formal research. Many of the experiences
with educators and disability specialists that are described in this article resonated with
my family's experiences. Moreover, participants in this study often told me during interviews that they felt able to speak openly and frankly to me because I was a fellow
parent, and they thought I would fairly communicate their perspective in my writing.
Nonetheless, this is not a confessional or autobiographical essay. Neither my family's experiences nor any aspect of our own school district have been brought into this
discussion. The "origin stories" told by many parents were not a part of our family's
experience: we were fortunate that the initial diagnosis of our child's disability was
presented to us with great sensitivity and compassion by an exceptional team of specialists in Evanston, Illinois.
The origin stories that are the subject of this essay are not, therefore, a narrative
form that I myself have ever used. What I have shared with the diverse group of individuals and families who appear in the pages that follow is the experience of raising a
child with a disability in a particular culture and geographical area at a particular histor-
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Christine Campo: I hate him [the neurologist]. And you can
publish that. The man was so cruel when we went to get
the final diagnosis. He was so cruel. He gave it to us like,
oh, it was terrible. One of the worst moments of my life. I
could barely walk out of the building.
Author: Do you mean he was blunt or he exaggerated how
bad it was?
Christine Campo: Blunt, and he exaggerated and was cruel. I
mean it was just like, boom, boom, boom. And he had a
resident with him sitting there and observing, and I think
he performs for people ....

And he said, "What have you

been told about your son?" And I said, "Well, Dr. Seager
suspected he might have CP." And you know, you're always hoping they're wrong.
Robert Campo: I never understood exactly what CP was anyways in the first place. And then to have this guy just
throw it at you like that, it was really, it was kind of brutal.
Christine Campo: Oh, it was so cruel. He said, "Well, he's
right. And he may be mentally retarded, he may be an
invalid, he may end up in bed all of his life."
Robert Campo: "He'll never walk," and that.
Christine Campo: And it was just boom, boom, boom. And it
was like somebody shooting you or something.
Robert Campo: It was a tough day.
Christine Campo: And you get up and he shoots you again.
And I'd like to say right now that Ben [their son, now a
teenager] is on the honor roll. He is always being featured on TV for the telethon. He's a celebrity child.
They've had him in the newspaper on the front page doing articles on him.
I heard stories of this kind so often-and they were told
with such emotion-that they demanded attention and interpretation. At first I thought they were simply about doctors
who lack sensitivity in communicating with patients or, perhaps, that the parents were blaming the messenger for a particularly distressing message. In time, however, I came to understand that there are other meanings embedded in these
remarkably similar stories and that they refer to the present as
much as to the past. When Christine Campo refers to current
achievements by her son Ben, she provides a clue as to the
present concerns that animate these narratives of the past.
There are other clues, I shall suggest, that point toward an
even broader reference to-and critique of-the narrator's circumstances at the time of narration. These circumstances include a range of social and legal concerns that go far beyond
the troubling encounter with the doctor that is the ostensible
subject of the narratives.
ical moment. My narrative response to this experience, at least for now, takes the form
of an essay that attempts to communicate and to understand the voices of the parents
and professionals whose interactions are so critically important for these children.
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In the discussion that follows, I suggest that stories of this
kind constitute a form of "myth-making" in everyday life and
that such myths are highly relevant to the practices and perceptions of parents as they'negotiate their way through the educational and legal systems on behalf of their children. Myth-making, in this view, is part of the process of constructing a world
in which the families and children can live. This process is not a
unilateral act but involves interactions and occasional conflicts
with others-educators, psychologists, social workers, therapists, doctors, and lawyers-who may hold different views. As
much as anything else, the myths reflect and weave meanings
around such interactions.
This essay begins with a presentation of the myths themselves, but it then follows their implicit references to a set of
circumstances that exist at the time the myths are told. Years
have passed since the day the child was first diagnosed. The
child is now in school; the parents find themselves enmeshed in
the complex structure of special education that seems simultaneously to demand their participation and to reject their views
and preferences. The special education system is pervaded by
the professional culture and practices that have developed
around the concept of disability in our society, but the system is
also fundamentally a creature of the law. The experiences of
parents and their school-age children are the consequence of a
sweeping federal civil rights act designed to integrate children
with disabilities into the educational mainstream.
As it tracks the sometimes difficult relationships between
parents and professionals from the day of diagnosis to the later
processes of educational planning, this essay focuses on law as
well as myth. Law has structured the encounters with professionals that parents describe as frustrating and intimidating.
Law also offers the parents a set of rights that could redress the
imbalance of power and give greater weight to their views and
wishes. Yet parents generally reject the law as a solution to
their problem. They fear (and their apprehensions are echoed
by many educators' hostility toward lawyers and legal procedures) that recourse to the law will ultimately embed them even
more deeply in the adversarial and oppositional relationships
whose effects they find so painful.
The origin myths express the parents' awareness that they
live in a divided world marked by conflict and disparate understandings of their child. The myths point to the source of these
divisions: professional and lay responses to the fact that the
parents have given birth to a child society views as deviating
from the "norm" in certain culturally important ways. The origin myths also express an aspiration-and a determination-to
transcend the situation in which the parents and children find
themselves and to restore a sense of unity to their everyday
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lives. Paradoxically, the parents of children with disabilities discover that law works both to realize and to frustrate the creative
force of myth.
II. Myth and Meaning
In the frame of such an existence, what could suffering and
pain signify? Certainly not a meaningless experience that man
can only "tolerate" insofar as it is inevitable, as, for example,
he tolerates the rigors of climate. Whatever its nature and
whatever its apparent cause, his suffering had a meaning; it
corresponded, if not always to a prototype, at least to an order whose value was not contested.
-Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History: The Myth of the
Eternal Return ([1949] 1959:96)
What is the significance of stories that are often retold?
What distinguishes everyday stories from those that take on the
attributes of myth?
The narrative act is so fundamental to human society that it
is hard to imagine what life would be like without the telling of
stories. Isaac Bashevis Singer (1976:10-11) was not the first to
observe that, in a sense, human life is storytelling:
When a day passes, it is no longer there. What remains of it?
Nothing more than a story. If stories weren't told or books
weren't written, man would live like the beasts, only for the
day.... Today we live, but by tomorrow today will be
a story.
3
The whole world, all human life, is one long story.
In Acts of Meaning,Jerome Bruner (1990:111) describes the recognition among some psychologists in the 1970s and 1980s
that the Self is defined through the stories people tell and that
the "narrative truth" rather than the "historical truth" is what
matters most about these stories for the construction of identity. This insight was later broadened, by Bruner (pp. 116-17)
and others, to a recognition that the negotiation of the Self is
not an isolated process but involves the society and culture
within which the individual lives and acts.
The role of narrative in constructing concepts of self and
society has become clear in a multitude of studies, including
those addressing a broad range of law-related issues such as
race (e.g., Bell 1987; Davis 1989; Delgado 1989; Williams
1989), gender, 4 community (e.g., Engel 1984; Greenhouse
3 "Naftali the Storyteller and His Horse, Sus" (Singer 1976) is a children's story;
the speaker is Reb Zebulun. I encountered this passage in a newsletter for parents of
individuals with disabilities (PACER Center 1991-92:1)
4 A pioneering example of the use of narrative to address issues of law and gender is found in the work of Susan Estrich (1986). Her work and that of other feminist
narrative scholars are skillfully summarized, discussed, and defended by Kathryn
Abrams (1991) (focusing in particular detail on the work of Martha Mahoney, Patricia
Williams, and Marie Ashe).
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1986; Clifford 1988b; Perin 1988; Yngvesson 1988; Merry
1990; Greenhouse et al. forthcoming 1994), and the practice of
law (e.g., Sarat & Felstiner 1988; Cunningham 1989; Conley &
O'Barr 1990). Studies of law and literature have also emphasized that storytelling can construct a world in which values,
identities, norms, and relationships are defined through the selectivity and creativity of the narrator (e.g., White 1984, 1985;
Sherwin 1988). As James Boyd White (1990: ix) has observed,
"our acts of language are actions in the world, not just in our
minds ....

Whenever we talk we create a character for our-

selves and a relation with others: we offer to constitute a community of a certain kind, for good or ill, and this is often the
most important part of what we do."
The subject of this essay is a particular kind of narrative, a
kind I identify as "myth." I will suggest, to borrow White's
phrase, that the act of telling myth-like stories "creates a character" for children with disabilities and their parents as well as
defining a relationship to others. I will explore the ways in
which such narratives situate the parents and children in relation to the professionals with whom they must continually interact and in relation to the law which they may or may not
choose to invoke.
Why term these stories "myths"? It is useful to recall some
of the characteristics that have been associated with myth. According to Eliade (1963), who remains one of the most influential writers on the subject, myth in "archaic" societies refers not
to fantasy or fiction but to a "true story": "and, beyond that, a
story that is a most precious possession because it is sacred,
exemplary, significant" (p. 1). Myth provides "models for
human behavior and, by that very fact, gives meaning and value
to life" (p. 2). Myth, therefore, simultaneously announces
meaning and shapes behavior, it looks backward and forward, it
explains and it constrains.
The "truth" of myth differs from the "truth" of historical or
scientific accounts. Eliade ([1949] 1959:44-46) tells of a mythlike ballad recorded in a Rumanian village by the folklorist
Constantin Brailoiu. According to the myth, ajealous mountain
fairy had bewitched a young man and flung him from a cliff
shortly before he was to be married. His fiancee, in the company of a group of shepherds who recovered his body, sang a
beautiful lament "full of mythological allusions." As it happened, Brailoiu discovered that this myth referred to events
that were quite recent in origin and that the fiancee was still
alive. By interviewing her, he was able to discover some significant discrepancies between the mythic account and her own
recollections of the same events. She explained that the young
man had in fact slipped and fallen over the cliff; that he was still
alive and in pain when the shepherds brought him back to the
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village; that when he eventually died from his injuries, the fiancee did not sing a distinctive funeral lament; and that no one at
the time explained his death in terms of a jealous mountain
fairy. What is significant about this rapid transformation of an
ordinary misfortune into myth is that the villagers rejected the
fiancee's "true" historical reconstruction of the event, even
though many of them were also present at the time of the
young man's death. For them, the myth spoke to a deeper reality-it was truer than truth: "When the folklorist drew the villagers' attention to the authentic version, they replied that the
old woman [i.e., the fiancee] had forgotten; that her great grief
had almost destroyed her mind. It was the myth that told the
truth: the real story was already only a falsification" (p. 46).
Myth, then, differs from history in its quest for deeper
meanings and for archetypes rather than for objective certainty.
It starts with the materials of human experience but transforms
their particularities into narratives that speak more broadly
about the essential nature of self and society. 5 As Austin
(1990:2) has suggested, "The student of myth must, sooner or
later, become a cosmologist since every myth both presupposes
and illustrates a cosmology, as every fact presupposes a complete theoretical system."
Myths, and the cosmologies they encode, often reflect the
dominant ideological systems in a society, but myths can also
be constructed by subordinate or disempowered groups. As
current jargon would have it, myths can also be counterhegemonic statements or instruments of struggle against the
established order (compare Lincoln 1989:7). Indeed, I suggest
in this essay that the myths constructed by parents of children
with disabilities emerge from troubled interactions between the
parents and the established order and constitute a critical commentary by the parents on those interactions.
There is another characteristic of myths that distinguishes
them most significantly from other forms of storytelling: They
tend to deal with origins, with birth, with beginnings. Eliade
(1963:5-6) noted this emphasis in the myths of "archaic" peoples, which were typically stories of gods and goddesses:
[M]yth tells how, through the deeds of Supernatural Beings, a

reality came into existence, be it the whole of reality, the Cosmos, or only a fragment of reality-an island, a species of
plant, a particular kind of human behavior, an institution.
Myth, then, is always an account of a "creation"; it relates
how something was produced, began to be. (Emphasis in original)
The myths of everyday life in contemporary society, unlike
5 "[M]yth, though determined in its form by its immediate historical context,
transcends any historical moment, being at the fundamental level the quest for the
self" (Austin 1990:2).
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those of "archaic" peoples, do not necessarily deal with supernatural beings, but the emphasis on "how something.., began
to be" remains an essential attribute, one that is readily apparent in the stories told by parents about the initial diagnosis of
their child's disability.
The retelling of myths about origins represents, in Eliade's
view, an attempt to transcend historical time, with its relentless
linear progression, its "irreversibility." Myths reaffirm the cyclical nature of time, the capacity of humans to return to "beginnings" and to "regenerate themselves periodically by abolishing past time and reactualizing the cosmogony" (Eliade [ 1949]
1959:74). The return to primal events allows humans to clarify
existential meanings that are sometimes obscured by the misfortunes and suffering that drain everyday life of its value and
direction. By transcending linear, "historical" time, the narrators of myths not only regenerate themselves but also reaffirm
and "reactualize" the cosmic order that they find encoded in
the myths. The retelling of myths allows the narrators to rework the raw materials of experience according to shapes and
patterns that now appear significant and to explore their implications for contemporary situations. Myths-like dreams-allow the narrators of past events to "keep doing it until they get
it right," to wrestle with an account of what occurred and what
was said until fundamental truths shine through the story.
These truths illuminate not only the past but the time of the
retelling. The retelling of myths is thus many things at once: an
act of insight, a reinterpretation of the past, a reaffirmation of
core values and beliefs, and a "reactualization" of the cosmic
order.

III. Diagnosis
There is something curious about autobiography. It is an account given by a narrator in the here and now about a protagonist bearing his name who existed in the there and then, the
story terminating in the present when the protagonist fuses
with the narrator ....

The Self as narrator not only recounts

but justifies. And the Self as protagonist is always, as it were,
pointing to the future.
-Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning (1990:12 1)
The story told by the Campos, quoted above, recounts a
chilling moment when existence seemed frozen and suspended
between conventional expectations for their family and a future
of suffering and uncertainty. They analogize that moment to an
attack by a sadistic gunman who shot them again and again as
they attempted to regain their feet. Playing to his audience (a
young resident), the doctor dramatized the bad news, expressing no sympathy or sensitivity and presenting the diagnosis in
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the most negative terms possible. The prognosis was very bad:
their son could be permanently bedridden and "retarded;" he
would make little progress and give them no parental satisfaction. At the end of their story, the Campos stress how wrong
the doctor was. Their child had become a teenager who was
mobile enough to attend high school, intelligent enough to be
an honors student, and successful enough to bring satisfaction
to his family and to others who read about him in the newspaper or saw him on the television.
The stories parents tell about the diagnosis of their children's disabilities are of two basic kinds. One group of stories
resembles that of the Campos in most significant respects. The
doctor was cruel and insensitive; the diagnosis was overly negative; despite the doctor's dire predictions, the child has gone
on to achieve far more than anyone thought possible. Carla
Weiss, for example, recalls that her doctor told her that her 11month-old child "was going to be a vegetable" and should be
institutionalized. "They felt that he wasn't going to progress
into anything. The best idea was to put him in a home and forget about him." She ignored the neurologist's advice and, as
her child grew older, he eventually entered the public school
system, got around with a wheelchair and a walker, and became
an avid sports fan. Nancy Moore recalls the words of her child's
neurologist (by chance, the same doctor who diagnosed the
Campos's child):
"There is no hope for [your child]." He said, "Just as you see
her there right now"-this is when she was two months
old!-"this is how it's always going to be. She is never going
to walk, talk, crawl. She's never going to be nothing more
than a vegetable." He sees her now, and I can't help but
smile. And Dr. Wood doesn't smile.
In one of the most disturbing variations on this theme,
Christine Hibbard remembers that when her daughter was one
year old, her doctor told her that the child should be sterilized.
Exaggerated or erroneous initial diagnoses can thus have lasting effects, although parents take pleasure in telling how their
children have ultimately prevailed. Mary Perkins, for example,
was told that her 9-month-old child was severely mentally retarded as well as physically disabled. This diagnosis, although
incorrect, stayed with her child for the next nine years. Every
sign of intelligence was dismissed by his teachers: "Oh, he's
just very verbal. He's very verbal, that's all. It's a mask. He's
really retarded. He's just very verbal-look at his mother!" It
was not until the boy was 10 years old, having been educated
with other "retarded" children all his life, that the error in the
diagnosis was finally recognized by someone other than his
mother.
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In telling their story of the initial diagnosis, parents 6 often
draw on a second narrative pattern that, at least superficially,
seems to contradict the first. In this second type of story, it is
the parents who first realize that something is "wrong" with
their baby, but, try as they might to persuade the doctor, their
apprehensions are discounted and the evidence of their own
perceptions is ignored. The following story is told by Elaine
Brown, whose husband as well as her pediatrician refused to
accept her assertions that the child was not developing "normally:"
He wasn't tracking. I mean, I was watching him, and he
wasn't tracking. And Dr. Williams is telling me, "Oh, I don't
think

. .

." I said, "Well, what about sitting? I know it's still a

little too early for him to sit, but there's NOTHING. I mean,
there's absolutely nothing there. You know, he's not grasping
anything. He's not even batting anything yet. There's nothing." "Well, give him time. If you don't have problems, blah,
blah, blah."
Well, by this time I was really starting to get panicky. And
this was still all behind my husband's back ....

I would say

something very meekly, like, "Oh, did you notice, Eric
doesn't look at the boys when they walk by .... And by now

my husband was starting to get irritated ....
And another thing was his one eye was, like, turned in,
like right toward his nose? And it would just flop back and
forth. And that's, my kids saw that. And when I took him to
Dr. Williams, I said, "What about his eye?" "Well, it's just a
lazy eye, and when he gets older if it doesn't go away, we can
put a patch on it .. "
I think he was afraid. I think he was, he knew but he
didn't want to be the one to tell me....
Eventually she persuaded her doctor to refer them to a specialist, and she insisted that her husband take the day off from
work in order to accompany her to the specialist's office. Elaine
Brown's story continues:
Dr. Kennedy came in and he worked, you know, stretching his
legs and his arms and turning his head, and he looked at his
eyes and the whole business. And he said, "I am making a
diagnosis of cerebral palsy here." . . . He said, "He needs

extensive therapy." And he said, "I cannot tell you if he will
ever walk or talk or be a normal child." .. . Well, my husband,

he turned white as a sheet. I thought he was going to faint
6 It may already be apparent that most-but not all-of the parents quoted in this
article are mothers rather than fathers. In considering the power disparities between
parents and professionals, it is important to keep in mind that the parent most often
involved on behalf of the child is the mother. Gender stereotypes undoubtedly play a
part in the construction of authority and in assumptions about objectivity and subjectivity in the decisionmaking process. Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to
refer only to "mothers" rather than to "parents" in this discussion. Fathers often participated in my interviews, though they were often less vocal than their spouses, and
their views and their role in the CSE process cannot be overlooked.
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right there in the room. I started to cry, I don't know why, but
I just started to cry. I mean, I knew, but I just started to cry,
and he's looking at me, and then he started to cry.
In this second type of story, told with the same degree of
intensity as the first, the diagnosis of disability does not come
as a surprise to the parent (at least not to the mother in this
story). Indeed, the parent is well aware that things are "not
right" with the child but cannot convince the doctor to pay attention to her concerns. Typically, the parent in question is the
mother; and sometimes, as was the case with Elaine Brown, her
husband joins the doctor in denying the importance of the
signs or symptoms she reports.
Elaine Brown now suspects that her pediatrician knew Eric
had cerebral palsy but was too timid (or perhaps soft-hearted)
to acknowledge what was already obvious even to Eric's siblings. Parents who tell stories similar to Elaine Brown's, however, do not usually interpret the doctor's "denial" in a positive
light. In Mary Roth's account, for example, her doctor was not
protecting her but ignoring her:
For a year this idiot pediatrician said, "He'll walk when he's
ready, he'll talk when he's ready, he'll do this when he's
ready." And I kept crying to my parents, "This isn't right."
But what else do I do? They said, "Find another doctor." I
said, "But this is who all my friends go to." You know, what
could be wrong with a pediatrician? He's a trained man. Well,
little did I know.
Mary Roth found it frustrating that the doctor condescendingly
interpreted her concerns as the imaginifigs of an overanxious
mother. When she moved to another city, she saw a new doctor, who immediately made the diagnosis of cerebral palsy. By
then, her child was already 15 months old.
Parents, especially mothers, recall with anger that their doctors told them they were imagining things. Cynthia Miller's
story suggests that she knew there was something wrong "as
soon as I held him after he was born. I didn't think he was as
strong. He was very floppy." Could a disability actually be detected that soon after birth? Clearly her doctor did not think so:
"He kept telling me that I was looking for problems." Ultimately, her suspicions proved to have been justified. Rachel
Dolan, who told her pediatrician that her son seemed listless
and unresponsive, was reassured that he "was a lazy baby.
Don't worry about it." Cynthia Mueller recalled that her son's
pediatrician ignored her concerns for a year and a half:
Then, at 18 months old, I finally got fed up with it because he
wasn't walking yet or anything. And I told the doctor, "Listen, I'm coming in. I think he's not walking right." And when
I went in there, he says, "By golly, you're right. He's not." He
said, "Take him to a neurologist." So we did.
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In each of these stories, conflict between parent and doctor
arises because the doctor refuses to acknowledge "facts" that
the parent can see with her own eyes. The doctor dismisses the
parent's concerns on the grounds that all parents-especially
mothers, whose gender is seen to make them vulnerable to
emotionalism and subjectivity-tend to be overly anxious
about their own children and to imagine that there are
problems when none in fact exist. In each of the stories, the
doctor is ultimately proved wrong and is forced to accept the
validity of the parent's concerns. In telling the stories, the parent emphasizes not only her own vindication but the harm resulting from the doctor's refusal to listen: harm to the child
(who could have started therapy or treatment earlier), to the
family (marital problems in the Brown family were exacerbated
by the doctor's rejection of Elaine's concerns about their baby),
and to the mother (whose self-esteem was injured when professionals treated her as an irrational person incapable of forming
mature judgments about the well-being of her own child).
Stories of this second type contrast in some ways with stories of the first type. In the second group of stories, it is the
parent rather than the doctor who first recognizes that the child
has a disability. The doctor is not overly blunt about the child's
condition. Rather, he or she seems oblivious to serious indications that there is a problem requiring attention. The parent is
not naive or blissfully ignorant but on the contrary is convinced
long before anyone else that her child is not developing or behaving normally.
Despite these superficial differences, the two types of stories are essentially similar. In both instances, there is a fundamental opposition between parent and doctor, a clash of perspectives and of personalities. In both instances, the doctor
violates basic norms of decency and respect by dealing with the
parent in a way that disregards her dignity as a person. In both
instances, it is the parent rather than the doctor who behaves
"normally" and the doctor whose behavior is inexplicable and
beyond the bounds of normal civility. In both instances, the
doctor relies on esoteric, scientific knowledge but is wrong
about the child, while the parent relies on ordinary common
sense and is right.
Because these "origin" stories teach such basic lessons and
rely on such fundamental, archetypal images of parent and doctor, they function as myths of everyday life. If one were to attempt to reconstruct the history of these early encounters in
the doctor's office by drawing on other sources and perspectives, one might find that the doctors remember the events
quite differently from the parents. The purpose of this discussion, however, is neither to.assert nor to question the historical
accuracy of the parents' narratives but to ask what deeper
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"truths" the parents convey in telling them, why the parents
tell them so often, and why the same basic narrative patterns
emerge again and again.
As myths, these stories deal with "beginnings," with "how
something... began to be" (Eliade 1963:5-6). The encounter in
the doctor's office represents the moment of transformation,
the moment when the child's disability was officially registered
as a fact that would change the family's life forever. 7 In retelling the story of this "beginning," the parent "illustrates a
cosmology" (Austin 1990:2) by showing how the interaction
between professional and layperson is fundamentally oppositional, how the layperson suffers from but ultimately triumphs
over the professional in this unequal relationship, how common sense proves superior to science, and how the child transcends the analytic categories of the very experts who are there
ostensibly to assist the child. The recapitulation of this "cosmology" is very important to the parents, not only in giving
meaning to past events but in clarifying their circumstances at
the time the stories are retold. In this sense, as Bruner (1990:121)
observes of autobiographical narratives in general, they speak
not only to the past but to the present and future.
As is generally the case with myths, the element of time is
central: both "the time of the stories and the time in the stories" (to paraphrase Gertrude Stein). 8 Retelling the stories is a
way to triumph over the particularities of historical time, to escape the pain and frustration of day-to-day events and to affirm
instead the lasting truths embedded in the mythical accounts of
these first encounters between parents and professionals.
I have suggested why these narratives might be considered
myths of everyday life and what values and worldviews they encode. In the discussion that follows, I try to explain why the
stories have such significance for parents of children with disabilities. Specifically, I examine three themes that link these narratives of the past to the parents' present concerns with schools
and the special education system for children with disabilities.
The first theme is that of parental exclusion from the processes
of evaluation and decisionmaking affecting their child. The second theme concerns clashes in the ways in which parents and
professionals perceive children with disabilities. The third
theme involves power disparities between parents and professionals in dealings concerning the children. All three themes
7 This moment of professional classification has enormous personal significance
for the families, but it also has legal, medical, and financial implications: Once a diagnosis is made, a range of professional services and entitlements becomes available, insurance reimbursements are provided, educational placements and programming are
initiated, and so on. I will discuss some of these sequelae below.
8 "It is understood by this time that everything is the same except composition
and time, composition and the time of the composition and the time in the composi-

tion" (Stein 1926:12).
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resonate in both the origin myths and in parents' stories about
current schools, teachers, administrators, and disability specialists.9
In discussing each of these three themes in turn, I suggest
linkages between origin myths and narratives of everyday life in
the present. Indeed, I argue that the origin stories are not fully
understandable unless the later, school-related narratives are
taken into account. As we have seen, the telling of myths is in
some senses an attempt to transcend time. It is, therefore, essential to consider how the meanings and significance of the
origin stories are established through connections across time
and to stress the relevance of these myths to the world of the
narrator at the time the myths are retold.

IV. Participating in Decisions about the Child
The historians have demonstrated that there is no such thing
as an even theoretically impartial observer, and the anthropologists have cynically undermined our hopes of getting inside the heads of other cultures, relativistically or otherwise.
The linguists and philosophers have, finally, hopelessly defamed the character of language as a possible vehicle for mutual understanding. So we are stripped down to our naked
myths, the bare bones of human experience. They may be our
last hope for a nonlanguage that can free us from these cognitive snares, a means of flying so low that we can scuttle underneath the devastating radar of the physical and social sciences
and skim close to the ground of the human heart.
-Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, Other Peoples' Myths:
The Cave of Echoes (1988:166)
At least once a year, usually in the spring or early summer,
parents of each child with disabilities meet with a Committee
on Special Education (CSE)10 in their school district to draw up
9 One additional point should be emphasized. The focus of the discussion will
shift from past to present, but the topic of discussion remains the same: the stories
parents tell about their experiences and those of their children. Although it would be
interesting to know how other actors in these particular stories viewed the same
events-and what narratives they might tell about them-in most instances it would
have been impossible to gain access to the perceptions of such actors (e.g., teachers,
administrators, psychologists) without violating assurances of confidentiality given to
the parents and, in some cases, placing both children and parents at risk. A number of
educators and other professionals were interviewed for this study, but their viewpoints
are presented here in general terms and not in response to the details of specific cases
or stories described by the parents. Their viewpoints are provided to help us understand how the worldview of the professionals contributes to the process through which
parents construct their stories. Yet the focus (for this article, at least) remains on the
stories parents tell and the ways in which those stories attempt to constitute a world in
which they and their children might live.
10 This is the name given in New York State to the interdisciplinary school district
committees mandated by federal statute. The original act authorizing the creation of
these committees was entitled "The Education for All Handicapped Children Act"
(1975). As well as making other changes, Congress in 1990 changed the act's name to
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an academic program specifically for their child. In these meetings, the CSE and the parents produce a document known as
an "Individualized Education Program" (IEP), I I which is, in effect, a binding statement as to the type of education and educational services that will be required in order for the child to
receive an "appropriate public education"' 2 in the "least restrictive environment"' 3 during the next academic year. The
annual IEP meeting provides the most visible focus for the parents' contacts with the special education system. In these annual rituals, the mythic themes of authority and resistance are
reenacted.
The annual IEP meeting is unusual in many respects. The
involvement of parents in the academic planning process did
not grow out of local customs or practices, nor is it the norm
for parents of children who are not considered "disabled." The
parents I interviewed were placed in this remarkable position
because the U.S. Congress determined in the mid-1970s that
direct parental involvement in the planning process was the
best means to protect the educational rights of "handicapped"
children. The enactment of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act in 1975 (now known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, or IDEA) was intended to reverse the
practice in most school districts of ignoring the educational interests and abilities of children with disabilities and of segregating them from their nondisabled peers. Finding that more than
half of the eight million "handicapped" children in the United
States did not receive "appropriate educational services" and
that one million were "excluded entirely from the public school
system,"' 14 Congress mandated the joint planning conference
as the mechanism by which an "appropriate education" in the
"least restrictive environment" could be achieved.' 5 If parents
were dissatisfied with the outcome of the conference, they
could make use of a process of appeals that could lead ulti16
mately to the federal courts.
"The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act" (IDEA) (1990) and substituted the

word "disability" for "handicap" throughout the text. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a).
''
IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(5) & 1401(a)( 2 0); 34 C.F.R. § 300.342 (1991).
12 IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(c) & 1401(a)(18).
13 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550-300.556 (1991). See also IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B)
(requiring that children with disabilities be "educated with children who are not disabled" to the "maximum extent appropriate").
14 IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(1), (3)-(4).

15 The congressional "mandate" was issued in the context of a spending bill.
States seeking money under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA)
had to comply with its provisions. Although in theory a state could ignore the act's
requirements and reject the federal funds it offered, in fact every state now complies.
16 Parents with a complaint have the right to an impartial due process hearing,
which may be conducted by their local educational agency (in effect, their school district). The decision of this agency may be appealed to the state education agency,
whose decision may then be appealed in the state or federal courts. Some states omit
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After enactment and implementation of this landmark statute, parents suddenly found themselves thrown into a situation
for which many felt ill-prepared. As they look around the conference table, they are likely to see teachers, psychologists,
therapists, school administrators, nurses, social workers, and
doctors.' 7 These professional members of the CSE use language to discuss children with disabilities that is foreign to
most parents. Parents find it difficult to understand the specialized evaluation procedures and the jargon that accompanies
them. Although it is their child who is being discussed, it does
not seem like their child. Aspects of the child that are familiar
and important to the parents are not mentioned at these meetings. Their own knowledge systems seem trivial and "unscientific" in comparison to the knowledge systems of the professionals. The parents sense that their comments carry less
weight in the CSE meeting because they are not couched in the
language of the professionals and because the parents' close
relationship to their child makes them seem overly subjective.
For these reasons, and because they feel isolated and outnumbered in a conference room filled with members of the professional team, parents are disinclined to advocate effectively for
their child.
The parents' situation in the special education system is
thus paradoxical. On the one hand, the entire framework of the
system rests on the involvement of the parent in the decisionmaking process. The logic of special education law takes for
granted that parents will participate effectively. In Board of Education v. Rowley (1982),Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, asserted that parental involvement in the IEP process provides assurance that the child's program will be "appropriate"
because "[p]arents and guardians will not lack ardor in seeking
to ensure that handicapped children receive all of the benefits
to which they are entitled by the Act" (p. 209). On the other
hand, parents themselves feel intimidated and excluded from
the decisionmaking process. They feel that their views carry little weight in comparison to the views of the professionals and
the first step of the process, with complaints going immediately to the state level.
IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)-(e)(4)(A); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510-300.511 (1991).

17 Federal law requires that the CSE meetings include a specialist in special education, the child's teacher, the child's parents or guardian, and the child "whenever
appropriate." IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20); 34 C.F.R. § 300.344(a) (1991). New York
law at the time of the study required in addition that each CSE include "a school psy-

chologist, a teacher or administrator of special education, a school physician, [and] a
parent of a handicapped child residing in the school district." New York Education Law

§ 4402(l)(b)(l) (1992). This law has since been amended, and instead of"a teacher or
administrator of special education," it now requires a "representative of such school
district who is qualified to provide or administer or supervise special education." New
York Education Law § 4402(l)(b)(l) (1993). In practice, I found that the number and

identity of the participants in the CSE meeting varied widely according to the customs
in each school district.
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that their participation in the meetings is primarily symbolic.
Many parents are hesitant to insist on measures that seem to
them appropriate, because they lack the training and professional knowledge to justify their position. Although they are
present at the meeting because they are laypersons and because
they are the child's parents, these become the very reasons
why, in their view, their participation has little effect on the IEP
conference.
I have sketched this system-and the parents' view of their
own role in it-in very general terms. Certainly some parents
participate with great skill in the IEP process, and some school
districts' committees effectively involve the parents in the decisionmaking process. On the whole, however, my interviews
with parents of children who have physical disabilities suggest
that the basic statutory premise of parental participation has
not, from the parents' perspective at least, been realized in
practice. Let us listen to the accounts of ordinary parents, not
necessarily those who have taken the unusual step of challenging or litigating with their school districts, and let us consider
how their stories of the IEP conference convey a perspective on
disability and on parent-professional relationships that is directly relevant to the "origin myths" described in the preceding sections.
When parents were asked to describe their most recent CSE
meeting, they generally recounted an experience in which they
felt intimidated, anxious, and fearful. They rarely described the
CSE meeting in terms that correspond to the exercise in cooperative decisionmaking suggested by the act. Donna Eberle, for
example, described her CSE as "a joke":
It's a very long, intimidating table where you're this tiny little
dot at one end, and they're all sitting up there at the other
end. And some of them are literally almost asleep, and they
could care less that they're there. As well as they're telling
you, they're delegating orders for your child that they have
never seen. They don't know anything about your child other
than what they've read and someone else has written.... And
they're telling me all these things that are good for Patricia,
that are not good for Patricia, and what they recommend and
what they think.
Parents rarely characterize these sessions in terms of a constructive give-and-take between themselves and the CSE members. Rather, they invoke imagery that suggests that they are
being judged or punished by the committee. Frank Haefner,
for example, observed: "You feel like you're going to the principal's office"; and Ann Haefner added, "You've got this feeling that they've been talking about you before you come into
the room .... You can't help but wonder what it was that was
said about your family before you came walking in the door."
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Julia Peterson compared her meeting to being on trial before
the CSE: "It reminded me of a courtroom or something. It was
a real big room ....

and of course you walk in and everybody

else is already seated and you feel so conspicuous and like
you're on trial or something. I found it really intimidating."
Laura Santoro compared her CSE to a "policeman" and herself
to a "pedestrian" and observed that they have "more control"
and "more rights" than she does.
The tendency to describe CSE meetings in imagery ofjudgment or punishment derives not simply from the layout of the
room or the numerical imbalance between parents and educators, although both of these factors are highly significant. Parents also feel that they are treated by committee members as
"suspects" rather than as fellow decisionmakers. Consider, for
example, Elaine Brown's first encounter with her CSE:
We walked in, and everybody is already seated because I think
we were a few minutes late.... I'm starting to walk toward
her [the CSE chair], and I had my hand out. And she said,
"You, sit over there!" . . . After we sat down, she said, "You

have a sheet of paper in front of you." And I was looking at
her. And she said, "Look down and look at it." I looked
down. I just could not believe this. I looked down, and she
said, "On that sheet, where I have starred, are all the people
that are here today."
Authority and control rest with the CSE, particularly with
the chair. Even when parents wish to play their part in the discussion and planning, they feel intimidated and overwhelmed.
Suzanne DeMarco said, "I get nervous when I'm with them, because it's 12 against 1." She went on to observe, "When I go to
that committee, I'm blown away. I mean, I've got to take a tranquilizer before I go. It's totally intimidating! . . . They have

these name plates in front of them, and they usually don't even
smile at you." Ann Haefner said, "You can cut the air with a
knife when you open the door." Frank Haefner added, "It's not
a very comfortable feeling when you go in there. It's always
like, what are they going to do to us next?"
The sense that "they" are in control and that they do things
"to" rather than "with" parents is reflected in Gerry Hagen's
comments as well: "You walk into one of these meetings blind.
You don't know exactly what's going to happen ....

We always

walk into there expecting to hear the worst." Some parents find
the stress and intimidation so overwhelming that they simply
do not participate. Mary Roth, for example, after repeated disagreements with her CSE, skipped the annual meeting "because I was throwing up. I was so upset at the prospect of having to face all of them that I didn't go."
The feeling of intimidation was expressed by most parents,
but there were a few exceptions. One school district was uni-
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versally praised. Its chair, according to the interviewees, was
warm, considerate, and sensitive to parents and children. In the
words of Jane Hanigan, "Most of the parents at District A have
no problems ....
Generally speaking, it's great out here....
Compared to other CSEs, ours is fantastic. I have no complaints whatsoever." The chair of District A's CSE, when interviewed for this study, expressed his awareness that parents
tend to feel "threatened" and "frightened." To alleviate these
feelings during the CSE conference, he made a point of sitting
next to them and writing out the IEP by hand as they agreed on
each item.
The chair of the CSE in District B was also aware that parents feel "petrified" at the CSE conference, but she found it
difficult to overcome such feelings: "I think we have to be sensitive to this, but I understand that's how they feel. What else
can we do?" Parents' perceptions of CSE meetings in District B
differed greatly from perceptions in District A, largely, it
seems, because of the contrasting attitudes of the two committee chairs. Whereas the chair in District A attempted to involve
the parents in the decisionmaking process from beginning to
end, the chair in District B saw her task as attempting to "persuade" parents to "accept" the recommendations made by the
professionals. In this regard, she observed that "fathers can be
more easily persuaded" than mothers, whom she saw as preoccupied with unimportant details. Since mothers participate
more frequently in CSE meetings than fathers, the CSE's job of
persuasion is often difficult:
Women are picky. Okay? They are, they're fussy ....
Moms
want to pick, pick, pick, pick. And I don't say that in a derogatory-I'm talking about myself. But they're at every petty little detail .... Take a look at the difference between a female
teacher and a male teacher. A male teacher can see it nice and
big. And a female teacher, I mustn't categorize them all,
they're at every little-you know what I mean? Come on, be
honest. Okay? You like that, don't you?
The CSE chair in District B responded to "pickiness" with
some impatience, and parents reported that she often appeared
hostile when they raised questions or made suggestions. Feelings of intimidation were strong among parents in District B
and tended to focus on the personality of the CSE chair.
Parents' negativity toward the CSE process reflects feelings
of intimidation such as those described above, but there are
other areas of dissatisfaction as well. A recurring parental complaint is that the CSE knows little about their child, yet reserves
the right to make important decisions without considering the
parents' insights. Ann Haefner asked, "Do they have a face to
even connect with these records? That would be nice, if they
knew who they were were talking about." Some parents bring
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photographs of their child to the CSE meetings to remind the
committee members that there is a real person behind the impersonal discussions and assessments. Some parents assume
that not knowing the child equates to not caring about the child
as a person. They share the feeling Jennifer Kuhn expressed
about her CSE chair: "She could care less. That's my feeling of
her is that she. could care less." This is one allegation, by the
way, that CSE members deny categorically. They feel that their
decision to enter the field of special education signifies that
they do care about children with disabilities and want to work
for and with them.
The parents' perception that the CSE does not care about
their children is closely linked to the perception that the CSE
does not care about the parents and their potential contribution to the IEP. Frank Haefner, recalling the CSE's failure to
respond to Ann Haefner's suggestions at the meeting, observed:
They just gave you your time to speak, and then they did what
they wanted to do anyways. They have-that impression of just
being a big machine, and you can go in there and you can
blow off steam and say whatever you want. And then they're
going to do what they basically want anyway. You really don't
have a whole heck of a lot of control over what's going on
there.
The perception of the CSE as a "big machine" that will
grind out its decisions regardless of the parents' contribution is
widely shared. Julia Peterson, for example, observed:
They really don't care what you have to say. They're going to
make up their minds according to the way they've done things
and they all agree to do things .... I just think it would be
nice if they were real receptive and maybe would listen to
some of the parents' ideas.
Suzanne DeMarco agreed: "I don't think parents have any say."
Joyce Majewski noticed that her CSE listens to her only as long
as she agrees with the decision they have already made. "But
the minute you question them on anything, they don't like it."
To some extent, as we have seen, the CSE chairs confirm
the perception that parental opposition to CSE recommendations is unwelcome. Rather than viewing the IEP process as one
in which the parents should participate from the beginning,
they view it as one in which the professionals should formulate
recommendations beforehand and parents should give their
approval at the meeting. The challenge facing the professional
members of the committee is thus to persuade the parents to
accept their determinations. For example, speaking in particular of the initial placement decision, the CSE chair in District C
observed that the basic goal is to "try to get the parent to approve that placement that is recommended, that will be recom-
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mended by the CSE. If that doesn't happen, it leaves us in a
dilemma. What are we going to do?" It is easy to understand
why CSE professionals could become frustrated if parents were
"picky" about accepting their recommendations. As the CSE
chair in District D stated: "They come to us for educational
services and educational advice, based on our experience and
knowledge of options, I would expect that they would follow
what we have to say."
From the perspective of the participants in the CSE process, there is a tension between the statutory model of cooperative planning envisioned by the congressional drafters and the
more familiar model of expert recommendation and parental
consent that is, perhaps, a product of the traditional culture of
professional-client relationships. Parents tend to experience
this tension as exclusion from the decisionmaking process. Professionals tend to experience it as occasional parental obstinacy
or meddling in matters they are ill-equipped to understand.
During my interview with two CSE members from District E,
there was a moment when their perspective on "persuading"
parents emerged with particular clarity. At this point in the interview, the two administrators turned and debated with each
other the advantages and disadvantages of working with "educated" parents:
A: An educated parent is much easier to work with.
B:

A:
B:
A:
B:

A:
B:

And I won't agree with you. Isn't that funny.... I do not
want a very uneducated person. I find those are difficult
to work with, because now you've got to do so much
background work you hoped was taken care of before you
got to Committee.
But their experience, the ones who are not really well
versed or well educated have had bad experiences with
schools themselves, so they don't trust the school.
Right.
No matter what you tell them, they're sure that you're
pulling a fast one on them.
But a very educated parent is working in, I'm sorry to
say, almost hostile to you. Whether the experience is
coming from a previous committee that they've dealt
with, whether it has been from private testing that they
have done on the child, whatever it is. They have come in
with the attitude of, I know the law and this is what I want
and you will give it to me.
Well, I would rather deal with educated, but not hostile.
Okay, but I have found that today they're almost getting
too educated the wrong way.

The dialogue swings back and forth, between apprehensions
about the parent who understands so little of what is being recommended that consent becomes problematic and apprehensions about the parent who understands (or thinks she under-
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stands) so much that she can dictate her preferences to the
committee and threaten legal action if the committee resists.
What does not emerge from this dialogue is an image of parents-whether "educated" or uneducated-as partners in the
deliberations and as coequals in the process of cooperative
decisionmaking.
The congressional objective of early parent involvement in
the planning process has led to frustration on the part of both
professionals and parents. To the extent that parents feel relegated to a role of stamping approval on decisions made without
actually considering their views, they would not agree that the
congressional purpose has been achieved simply because they
have been given a seat at the CSE conference table. Yet when
parents participate more assertively in the committee meeting,
they run afoul of professional expectations that have been conditioned by traditional models of expert recommendation and
consent. In School District A, where parents were so effusive in
their praise of the CSE chair, Jane Hanigan said that the CSE
chair made a point of asking her after each recommendation,
"Mrs. Hanigan, do you agree with that? Do you really think
that's the best for Don?" This approach is, however, the exception rather than the rule, and most parents come to feel that
their views carry little weight during the CSE meeting. Rather
than viewing the meeting as an occasion to share information
and work cooperatively to shape the "appropriate education"
mandated by the act, parents experience the IEP conference as
a tense, alienating, and intimidating experience in which they
are subjected to the authority of the professionals on the committee and are effectively excluded from the decisionmaking
process.
It is worth noting that the special education professionals'
approach closely resembles the model generally associated with
the provision of medical services. Indeed, the chair of the CSE
in District F explicitly compared decisions about special education services to those dealing with medical services. 1 8 Such
comparisons have great significance for interpretation of the
"origin myths" discussed above, in which doctors substitute for
special education experts. The parallels between the two types
of stories suggest that, in the parents' view, the "medical
model" operated in the past as it operates in the present to
produce a sense of exclusion and intimidation. Retelling the
origin story implicitly draws the thematic comparison even as it
affirms the parents' desire for a relationship based on greater
mutuality and respect.

18 See statement by the chair of District F's CSE, infra at p. 808.
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V. Two Ways of Seeing and Talking about Children
with Disabilities
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.
-Ludwig

Wittgenstein, PhilosophicalInvestigations

(1968:223)
The encounters between parents and professionals at the
annual IEP conference, like the encounters between parents
and doctors described in the origin myths, are "events of articulation" (Moore 1977:159); they are defining moments in
which roles, norms, and meanings become unambiguously apparent. They epitomize a set of relationships and experiences,
however, that go far beyond the brief interaction around the
CSE conference table. Parents sense that their worldview and
their understanding of their child differ fundamentally from
those of the professionals with whom they must deal. They
sense, as well, that these differences obstruct communication
and lead to divergent conclusions about who the child is, what
her future could be, and what programs are appropriate for
her. Moreover, the different worldviews of parents and professionals are, from the parents' perspective, associated with significant power imbalances, which grant superior authority to
the conclusions of the professionals and place the parents in a
position of-at best-resistance to the established framework
within which children with disabilities are "treated" and educated.
As described in the narratives of the parents and educators
I interviewed, professional knowledge about the child is
grounded in insights obtained through brief, intense, controlled, diagnostic encounters between child and professional.
Often the professional is a stranger to the child: knowledge of
the child outside the evaluational context is not necessary in
order to administer the battery of tests on which the CSEs typically rely. Reports from teachers and therapists who know the
child may supplement the standardized quantitative evaluations, but even these reports often strain to apply objective, scientific measures rather than subjective, anecdotal observations.
Validity, in this knowledge system, rests on quantitative comparisons of the child's performance to that of a preestablished
set of norms derived from the performance of other children.
"Truth" is subverted by personal knowledge or attachment or
by the parent's poor adjustment (from the professionals' perspective) to the child's disability. As the CSE chair in District C
observed: "A lot of parents make decisions based on their own
needs, not the needs of the kid. And this is one of the problems
I have in dealing with parents." Professionals must cut through
the fog of emotionalism and subjectivity to the "hard" reality of
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objective findings. The necessity for scientific objectivity is especially great when dealing with children with disabilities, since
emotions run so high and people's hopes and wishes can so
easily prevent them from coming to terms with painful truths.
The documents in the child's file are artifacts of the professional worldview. Professionals assume that these documents
will be difficult for parents to understand, not only because
parents are influenced by "denial," anxiety, and subjectivity
but because parents lack technical training in the field of special education. As the well-known and influential CSE chair in
District F told me:
I think this law has forced [parents] into thinking that they
could really have a true partnership with the professionals. . . . But I think personally it's somewhat unusual to expect. It's like saying to you, you can have a partnership with
the doctors who are going to treat you. You should have just
as much say in all of your treatments. You can't really have as
much say because it's too complicated.

We need not consider the implications of this statement for
the involvement of patients in medical decisionmaking. The implications for parental involvement in the IEP process are clear
enough. The same CSE chair went on to say:
If we don't really understand the different parts of the brain
and all the memory things and the processes, especially the
learning-disabled children, how can a parent really say what
should be done? I don't think parents can do quite as much as
...
Albany thinks that they can.
It is probably not surprising to find that some parents share the
view of this CSE chair. They, too, feel that the issues are simply
too complicated for them to understand, and they assume that
the professionals will "know best." Although they know their
child well, their knowledge is not the kind that counts or should
be considered. It is based "merely" on everyday experiences
and observations, on qualitative assessments, and on affection,
intuition, and aspiration.
Some parents, however, experience great frustration with
their inability to convey the validity of their own knowledge system during their interactions with professionals. In this clash of
epistemologies, parental frustration can be expressed in a
number of different ways. One way is to argue that "superior"
education and professional credentials do not automatically
qualify the CSE members to make decisions about one's child
or disqualify the parent from having a significant voice. This is
Gail Schreiber's view:
You can have your Master's, you can have your Ph.D., and
you put all of this education, which is good-but nobody
knows everything. Some of these people just don't like to be
told that they don't know everything, that they could be
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wrong. And that's where a lot of problems start. [Q.Why do
they feel that they "have all the answers"?] Because they're
professionals, and they're experts in child education. And
you're a parent and, like me, I've never gone to college....
But I'm still the child's mother. I live with her 24 hours a day.
I know what upsets her; I know what makes her happy. And
just because you've got this stuff written on paper does not
make you right and me wrong.
The Schreibers had opposed their CSE's recommendations
and, after a struggle, had ultimately prevailed. This led Gail
Schreiber to the conclusion that parents had to resist the assumption that those with the superior credentials should make
the determinations: "Unless you open your mouth and you
fight, you have no say on what goes on with your kid. They
could put your kid in Timbuktu if they wanted to."
Many other parents concurred with this view, which finds its
counterpart in the version of the origin myths in which the doctors refused to listen to the mothers' concerns about their babies' development. Such parents asserted that their perspective, while different from that of the professionals, had its own
legitimacy. Christine Campo, for example, acknowledged that
"'a lot" of parents defer to professionals because they are better
educated and should know better, but she felt that was simply
"baloney": "If nothing else, I found out, nobody knows better
than you." While thejudgment of professionals should be considered, she believed that she knew what was best for her child.
Although cloaked with the mantle of professionalism, the specialists are merely human and are far from infallible:
The one time I sat there and I looked [around the conference
table], the psychologist was a man about town who didn't
have his children living with him ....

The person who was

head of the Committee on the Handicapped, and still is, is
unmarried, doesn't have any children. I just looked around
the table, and not any of them, for one, had children living
home, or did any of them have a handicapped child. And yet,
they're telling me, "Well, Christine, you have to do it this
way." That condescending attitude, like. And it took me a few
years to finally realize, who do you think you are telling me
how I should deal with these problems?
There is an "emperor's new clothes" aspect to the discovery that the CSE members are not only fallible persons whose
judgment may be questioned for many reasons, but that some
of them actually know little about children with disabilities. Angela Rose was surprised to learn, when she became a parent
member of the CSE, that the intimidating chair of her committee was actually less informed about disability issues and special education than many parents. Arlene Koch, another parent
member of the same CSE, visited a classroom for "severely involved" children with the CSE chair and was surprised to see
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how awkward and unfamiliar she was with children who had
severe disabilities: "She was so uncomfortable. She was almost
jumping out of her skin to see kids that had to be fed. It was
obvious that she didn't have a lot of exposure to severely handicapped children."
Parents find great significance in such observations. On the
one hand, the observations underscore the important fact that
parents' practical experiences with their own children provide a
fund of knowledge and information that the CSE professionals-who, in these stories, were childless or unfamiliar with
children like theirs-simply lacked. In this sense, then, parents
are able to portray themselves as more knowledgeable than the
professionals, not less. Further, such stories provide a basis for
asserting that the knowledge system of the professionals must
be supplemented-or countered-by a different kind of knowledge system based not on science but on their own experiences
and common sense.
Parental resistance to professional authority thus finds expression in stories that show the professionals are merely
human, that they have their own personal problems, that they
lack practical experience with disabilities, that they are awkward or frightened when in the presence of the very children
for whom they so confidently pronounce judgments about educational programs and placements. Resistance is sometimes expressed in another, even more subversive, type of storytelling.
In these accounts, parents show how the very act of professional evaluation can be an exercise in foolishness. Such stories
place the artificiality of the testing process in opposition to the
common sense of the parent-observer. Ruth Mueller, for example, recalled Jon's first interview with a psychologist. Jon was
tired and not in the mood for the tests the psychologist insisted
on administering. Finally, he gave Jon an ugly old doll with its
arms, legs, and head taken apart and told him, "Okay, Jon, put
everything where you think it belongs." Jon promptly threw the
whole doll in the garbage can. Ruth Mueller laughed and
thought to herself, "God, he's smart."
The point of the story, for Ruth Mueller, was that Jon's
clever response had triumphed over the artificial routines of
the psychologist but in ways that the specialist could not measure-or even understand. A somewhat different point emerges
from a story told by Joyce Majewski about a psychologist who
drew far-reaching conclusions about her son, Bryan, from the
picture Bryan chose to draw during his evaluation. Bryan, who
was a sports fan, drew a careful portrait of a hockey goalie. The
psychologist concluded that Bryan's decision to draw a mask on
the goalie indicated that Bryan hid his feelings just as the goalie
hid his face. Joyce Majewski argued that this conclusion was ridiculous and was unsupported by the opinions of anyone else
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who knew or worked with Bryan. The commonsense explanation was that goalies are often heroes to children in this city of
avid hockey fans, and goalies always wear masks when they
play. A child would no more draw a goalie without a mask than
a football player without a helmet and face guard. Joyce Majewski's anecdote makes the psychologist look foolish because the
specialist tried to find deep, complex meanings hidden in behavior that is readily understandable to anyone with any sense.
In stories like these, parents convey a view of the world
reminiscent of the view contained in the "origin myths" discussed earlier. They contrast the ordinary, everyday world of
experience and common sense to the overly theorized, impractical, and sometimes silly world of psychologists and professional educators. It could be argued that Mueller and Majewski
were indeed guilty of a failure to understand the methods and
concerns of the professionals. Whether a child with disabilities
really does understand where the different parts of the body
"go" or really does hide his feelings may be important and difficult questions. Perhaps the parents were insufficiently sensitive to their significance. From the parents' perspective, however, such questions should be approached in a less artificial
way and the answers should be grounded in the concrete realities of the child's day-to-day life and the insights of those who
know the child best. Instead of asking a cranky child to "play"
with a dirty, unfamiliar doll while a stranger watches and takes
notes, why not have a conversation with Jon's parents and
teachers or observe Jon in his own environment? Instead of
concluding from a single crayon drawing that Bryan hides his
feelings, why not talk with Bryan and his family and teachers
about how he expresses or withholds feelings-and about his
perception of hockey goalies? The methods of the professionals fail, in these narrative accounts, because they deliberately
exclude consideration of the world of the parents and the child
in favor of simulation and laboratory-like test conditions.
The exclusion of the parents' world and worldview, according to these stories, exposes the professional to the risk of
overinterpretation and foolish violations of common sense. It
also contributes to the disempowerment of parents, since the
interpretive framework of the specialist rather than that of the
parent provides the basis for CSE decisionmaking. There is another consequence as well. Whereas parents tend to perceive
the whole child and to emphasize capabilities, the professionals
tend to perceive the child in terms of "defects"--those aspects
of the child that deviate from the norm and justify the child's
classification as "handicapped" or "disabled." The defects are
the basis for professional intervention; the defects are the
raison d'etre of the CSE meeting, and the CSE committee itself; the defects are the reason the law requires "special" edu-
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cation and remediation. The CSE's emphasis on "defects" can
convey a highly negative message to parents, according to the
CSE chair in District G:
Unfortunately, most of the things that you say are negative.
You're saying all these things about this person's child, and
it's very hard. At first there are many, many positive things on
the other side of the coin. But you want to get a point across
that your child needs help, and your child's not doing this
and your child's not doing that. So sometimes it seems very
negative. And we don't mean to be that way, but I can understand how frightening it must be.
The contrast between the parental view of the whole child
(or the child in the context of the world in which she lives) and
the professional focus on the child in terms of "defects" is suggested, indirectly, by a passage in Oliver Sacks's book, The Man
Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat (1987). Sacks, a neurologist and
specialist in brain dysfunction, recalls that he had examined a
patient named Rebecca in the hospital. Acting in his professional role, he had perceived Rebecca "as a casualty, a broken
creature, whose neurological impairments I could pick out and
dissect with precision" (p. 180). Rebecca's performance on the
tests was "appalling," but, by chance, Sacks later encountered
her in the hospital garden on a beautiful spring day. Here, she
seemed entirely different: smiling, composed, taking pleasure
in her surroundings. She greeted Sacks and gestured toward
the lovely foliage. She spoke to him in disjointed but poetic
phrases:
'spring', 'birth', 'growing', 'stirring', 'coming to life', 'seasons', 'everything in its time'. I found myself thinking of Ecclesiastes: 'To everything there is a season, and a time to
every purpose under the heaven. A time to be born, and a
time to die; a time to plant, and a time . . .' This was what

Rebecca, in her disjointed fashion, was ejaculating-a vision
of seasons, of times, like that of the Preacher. 'She is an idiot
Ecclesiastes,' I said to myself. And in this phrase, my two visions of her-as idiot and as symbolist-met, collided and
fused. (Ibid.)
Sacks ponders the question why these two "visions" of Rebecca could be so different. His answer implies that it is not
simply that Rebecca is both "idiot" and "symbolist" but that
Sacks himself "knew" Rebecca in two different ways and saw
her in two different settings. The neurological and psychological tests had been designed "not merely to uncover, to bring
out deficits, but to decompose her into functions and deficits."
Emphasizing pattern perception and problemsolving, they
"had given no inkling of anything but the deficits, of anything,
so to speak, beyond her deficits" (p. 181). The tests he had ad-
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ministered had provided no insights into the young woman he
had encountered in the garden:
They had given me no hint of her positive powers, her ability
to perceive the real world-the world of nature, and perhaps
of the imagination-as a coherent, intelligible, poetic whole:
her ability to see this, think this, and (when she could) live
this; they had given me no intimation of her inner world,
which clearly was composed and coherent, . . . [when] approached as something other than a set of problems or tasks.
(Ibid.)t 9 (Emphasis in original)
In this passage, Sacks experiences and conveys both sides
of the dichotomy. His view of Rebecca in the examination
room, he suggests, typifies a professional perspective based on
test procedures designed to evaluate deficits; his view of Rebecca in the garden, on the other hand, approximates the perspective of parents who draw on everyday insights and experiences in the world. It is rare for any one person to understand
both perspectives. More commonly, parents and professionals
talk past one another and fail to agree on who the child is
whose fate rests in their collective hands. This is a more
profound problem than parents' simple inability to understand
professional terminology or concepts. Parents sense that the
child they know is an essentially different person from the child
discussed by the professionals at the CSE meeting. One might
visualize this collision of conceptual worlds by imagining Rebecca's parents trying to convey her personality and her capabilities-as they saw them day after day in her natural environment-to a diagnostician who had not had the benefit of
Sacks's accidental observation of Rebecca outside the examination room. It is unlikely that the parents could find words to
convey this reality to the professionals, or that the professionals-no matter how sensitive to the problem of appearing
overly negative about the child-could understand the significance of what the parents were trying to tell them. The two
worlds of the parents and the professionals would remain separate, and within those two worlds, two very different Rebeccas
would exist.
For which of the two Rebeccas should the IEP be written?
This was not the issue in the case Sacks describes, of course,
but it is the issue for the millions of school-age children who
are the subjects of CSE meetings across the country each year.
The IDEA has little to say on this issue. It does preclude CSEs
from basing their evaluations on any single test,20 and it does
protect the right of the parents to participate in the meetings
and appeal adverse decisions. Yet there is nothing in the act
19 The bracketed word "when" is used here to correct an apparent typographical
error in the original text.
20 IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C).
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that requires the CSE to focus on "positive powers" rather
than deficits, on the "composed and coherent" inner worlds of
the children rather than the difficulties they experience when
they encounter human society in its various forms (including
the testing routines contrived by disability specialists). There
is, in short, nothing in the act that gives special legitimacy to
the parents' version of the child rather than the professionals'
version.
The frustration parents experience at the CSE meeting derives ultimately from this sense that the child they know is
never really brought before the committee. This is what they
mean when they emphasize repeatedly that no one on the committee knows their child and that no one really listens to them.
This is why they sometimes bring photographs of their children
to the annual meeting-a vain attempt to convince the CSE
members that there is a different reality out there that has escaped the committee's attention, a different child who has not
been adequately described by the terms and concepts employed in the CSE discussions. Yet parents sense that every attempt they make to convey this different reality to the committee results only in a confirmation of the professionals'
perception that the parents are essentially emotional, subjective, and incapable of understanding the scientific basis of
childhood disabilities and special education.

VI. Law, Power, and Participation
"That's all, and life went on." . . . "No. There's still something in my heart about this that isn't finished. My heart is still
shaking. The story hasn't come completely out. I'm going to
talk more about it until it does. Then, I'll go on to another.
Then, my heart will be fine."
-Nisa in Marjorie Shostak, Nisa: The Life and Words of
a !Kung Woman (1983:40)

If, as I have suggested, the parents of children with disabilities construct the world differently from the professionals with
whom they must negotiate in the IEP meeting, one might ask
why the parents' interpretations and preferences do not prevail
more often. The parents seem to hold a trump card: the right
to request an impartial hearing when dissatisfied with a CSE
decision, the right to appeal the hearing officer's decision to
the State Education Department, and the right to take their
case to federal district court if unhappy with the results of the
hearing process. In short, parents can consult lawyers and invoke the law, which was written to protect their interests and to
ensure that their view of the child is heard by the CSE. In theory, these legal protections should redress potential power disparities between parents and professionals. Since hearings are
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very costly to school districts and parents may have access to
various types of no-cost legal services, the law should actually
place parents in an advantageous position. Even in the cases
where parents do not seek legal counsel, the knowledge that
they might do so should equalize the balance of power.
The parents' accounts suggest, however, that their due process rights have little effect on the IEP conference, except in
those rare cases where the parents actually bring an advocate
with them. In large part, this is because many parents simply do
not know the law and have no idea what rights they could invoke. They assume that the CSE provides them and their child
with all that the law guarantees. Others are less trusting but
sense that legal confrontation with their own school district
could be viewed as antisocial or, at the least, could disrupt an
important relationship that must continue as long as their child
remains in school. 2 ' Those interviewees who did give some
consideration to consulting an attorney usually decided not to
take what they considered a drastic step.
The triggering event causing a few parents to overcome
their reluctance to wage legal battle differs from one case to the
next. One of the most revealing stories was told by Mary Roth.
Roth had engaged in a series of skirmishes with her CSE. Some
of the professionals insisted that her son, Tim, was "mentally
retarded," while Roth maintained that he was "learning disabled." This basic disagreement led to conflicts over classroom
placements. Eventually, Roth went for an educational evaluation by an independent center. She was told that the center's
social worker would be contacting them to initiate the evaluation. This pushed Roth and her husband over the edge and led
them to the Education Law Clinic. It was not just that the Roths
did not like social workers. They felt strongly that they did not
"need someone snooping into our lives."
Roth felt that the involvement of the social worker was
symptomatic of a general attitude by the professionals that children with disabilities (and their families) were automatically fair
game for intrusive and demeaning interventions that would
never be tolerated in cases involving children without disabilities:
If a child is not handicapped, the social worker doesn't come
by and say, "What are you doing with your children?" . . .
What makes my son, because he has a learning disability, any
different than any other child? You're singling them out, and
I don't believe in that.... Treat them like a human being. I
don't like social workers at all. I don't like that type of prying.
If I need help, I'll ask for it. That's why we went to [the Education Law Clinic].
21 See Engel (1991:194-203), where the problems of rights assertion are discussed at greater length.
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Mary Roth viewed the intervention of a lawyer on her behalf as an alternative to the unwanted intervention of a social
worker. The social worker, she felt, was not working in her interests but continued a series of interactions with professionals
that she found degrading and irrelevant. She wanted someone
who would get Tim what he needed and deserved, not someone. who would, in her view, unnecessarily pry into the private
concerns of the family.
Roth's story highlights an important relationship between
the parent-professional dichotomy (discussed in the preceding
section) and the involvement of attorneys and advocates. For
the Roths, the degrading ministrations of the social worker
confirmed a more general sense that the professionals made
their family the passive objects of the evaluation and service delivery process. What the Roths wanted, on the other hand, was
to be active participants whose role was roughly comparable and
equal to that of the other participants. The only way they found
it possible to transform their status from that of object to participant was to engage the services of a professional advocate.
By this means alone, they acquired the power to be heard when
they articulated preferences, expressed opinions, and tried to
safeguard their child's rights.
Even when an attorney does not initiate a hearing or appeal, from the parents' perspective his or her mere presence at
the CSE meeting makes a significant difference. Parents note
that, in the presence of an advocate, the CSE members become
more attentive and courteous. Mary Ann Young observed that
when her advocate spoke to the CSE they listened, but when
there was no advocate present and she said the same thing to
them, "I'm an aggressive mother; I don't know anything."
Arlene Koch decided to bring her son with her to a CSE meeting that her attorney also attended. The combined presence of
child and advocate changed the tone and dynamics of the meeting completely:
Totally different and genuine. Now it's like, "Oh, well, Mrs.

Koch" ... They were so apologetic, and they kept saying,
"Oh, Mrs. Koch, we didn't realize that he was this involved."
And I thought, "Hasn't anybody seen this kid?" He is almost
10 years old, and it really seemed like nobody had ever seen
him.
Christine Campo felt that the involvement of an attorney not
only changed the tone of the meeting but tipped the balance of
power in her favor for the first time:
They kind of gave me power and the knowledge to know that,
yeah, I can fight City Hall. Before that, I thought I was just
one parent in the wilderness and accepting what they were
giving, until I found that... they have to provide him with a
full day of school, they have to provide adequate busing.
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The few parents who use an attorney may feel that they
have corrected the power imbalance between themselves and
the professionals and that the attorney enables them to participate in the IEP process with greater effectiveness. CSE members, however, view the involvement of attorneys in very different terms. A distinct minority of the CSE chairs I interviewed
spoke of the involvement of attorneys positively, as an opportunity to introduce new perspectives and new sources of information as well as an opportunity to alleviate parents' fear and
stress.2 2 The CSE chair in School District A, whom parents
praised for his openness to parental involvement, observed
that while some advocates are "unreasonable" or are "on a
power trip," they can play an important, positive part in the
CSE process:
I think that they have a lot of expertise to offer, and also
they're there to protect the kids' rights and a parent's rights.
And I think that's important, too, because many times they
can be lost by different committees.... I've learned a few
things from advocates and attorneys and other professionals
who deal with testable kids and making recommendations for
programs.... I think the input is good. And I think the interpretations of testing data are good, and also they can offer
you availability of other programs that, maybe, being in a little rural area, you just don't know about.
The majority of CSE chairs, however, feel that there are significant drawbacks to the involvement of advocates in the IEP
process. The CSE chair in School District H, for example,
noted that advocates tend not to know the child as well as the
CSE members do, and he complained that advocates could "intimidate" and sway committee members who fear the possibility of a hearing. The CSE chair in District I commented that the
participation of an advocate introduces an element of legalism
that makes things "very, very difficult" for the committee. The
CSE chair in District J observed that committee members tend
to take it personally when an advocate supports a parent's objection to a CSE's recommendation, particularly when the CSE
feels it has already "bent over backwards" on the child's behalf.
The CSE chair in District K noted that some advocates approach matters in a positive way but others "come in with an
axe to grind." He and the other members of the committee
"really bristle sometimes if an advocate comes in with 'thou
shall do this and thou shall do that, and you guys are screwing
up and this is the way that it will be.' " He resents it when advo22 1 must mention that all CSE chairs I interviewed were aware that I was on the
faculty of the State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, which sponsors the
activities of the Education Law Clinic in special education cases throughout Western
New York. It is possible that this shared institutional affiliation affected the comments
that CSE officials made about the role of lawyers and reduced their criticisms. Even so,
as we shall see, their comments tended generally to be negative.
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cates unnecessarily create an "adversarial relationship." However, he concluded, "We don't mind advocates coming in."
Some CSE chairs I interviewed were unequivocally angry
about the role of attorneys in the special education process.
The CSE chair in District E, for example, was furious that an
advocate had succeeded in having an external recommendation
implemented so that a child received therapy five times per
week. The CSE had concluded that no therapy at all was necessary: "In other words, she's pulled out of her class five times
because of all these do-gooders who are really upsetting the
apple cart." The CSE chair in District B maintained that the
involvement of an advocate was an implicit statement that "Evidently, the parent doesn't trust us .... They have to get some-

body to protect their rights because we're going to violate
them." The presence of an advocate changes things markedly
for the worse: "I think immediately it sets up a poor tone. It
tends to be a very negative tone ....

Pretty soon, they've for-

gotten all about the kid and nobody even remembers that
there's a kid out there."
Perhaps most intriguing were the CSE complaints that intervention by an advocate tends to formalize the annual meeting and chill what is otherwise a warm and harmonious atmosphere. Even the CSE chair in District A complained that with an
attorney present the atmosphere becomes "very formal and
cold." Others said that the focus of the CSE shifts toward dotting all the i's and crossing all the t's.2 3 The CSE chair in District G voiced a recurring complaint when she observed that
the presence of an attorney impedes direct communication between the committee and the parent: "The few times that we've
had a lawyer or an attorney, the parent will not share their feelings. So right away, we have no idea what the parent thinks."
This type of complaint is particularly significant. The CSE
members dislike the sense that they cannot communicate directly with the parent but must speak through an intermediary.
When an attorney attends the CSE meeting, in the words of the
chair from DistrictJ, "the parent doesn't say boo; the advocate
says it." To counteract this problem, she makes a point of
speaking directly to the parents and asking for their views.
For the professionals who are members of the CSE, the involvement of attorneys disrupts direct communication with
parents and chills the warm feeling and openness that they feel
otherwise prevails in IEP conferences. For parents, by contrast,
the involvement of attorneys helps to counteract what they perceive as the cold formality and intimidating tone of the IEP
conferences, during which their opinions are seldom solicited
and their voices seldom heard. The disparity between the per23 E.g., Districts E and L.
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spectives of parents and professionals could not be more striking. Since their perceptions of the tone and character of the
IEP meetings are totally different, they reach opposing conclusions about the transformative effects of bringing lawyers into
the process to protect the interests of parents and children.
Implicit in the CSE complaints about advocates is an assumption that when parents attend without representation, the
meetings are generally informal and the parents contribute
freely and effectively to the decisionmaking process. How can
this assumption be reconciled with the parents' perception of
intimidation, formality, and unwillingness of the professionals
to listen to them? It appears that parents and CSE members
mean different things when they speak of formality and of parental participation. The parents feel that the presence of an
advocate is indeed consistent with their own effective participation in the CSE meeting, since the CSE, from the parents' perspective, usually does not hear or understand their views unless
expressed by a fellow professional-in this case, the attorney. If
the advocate were not there, the CSE members could speak directly to the parent but this, in the parents' view, would inhibit
and not enhance communication, since the parents' responses
would probably be disregarded. What the professionals experience as meaningful communication is experienced by the parents as domination and rejection. What the professionals consider a mutual and cooperative decisionmaking process is
viewed by the parents as a unilateral exercise of power and authority. Nor would the parents agree that the presence of an
advocate creates greater formality, since the ordinary workings
of the CSE are already interpreted by them as "formalistic."
CSE members seem to mean something different when they
speak of formalism and informalism. They are undoubtedly familiar with contemporary theories of mediation and group consensus building which emphasize that it is important for all participants to speak openly and honestly (to "vent") before a
decision is reached. Yet the application of such principles is
highly problematic in the context of drafting a child's IEP.
There is an asymmetry to the IEP conference that arises not
only because the parents and professionals speak different languages and view the world through different lenses, but also
because their status at the conference table is fundamentally
different. In the CSE meeting, one party enters the discussion
with control over resources while the other has only needs and
rights. The party with control over resources-the CSE-has
no needs or emotions to "share" or to trade, just as the party
with needs and emotions-the parent-has no resources to
offer in the negotiations. The negotiating process for the parent is, therefore, a matter of attempting to bargain for resources by citing needs-a frustrating and sometimes humiliat-
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ing process. As we have observed, the bargaining process is
further skewed by an unequal access to the language and the
information system in which needs must be articulated in order
to justify the expenditure of resources.
When the principles and methods of informalism are employed in this context, it is not surprising that one party-the
parent-would experience the meetings as formalistic and oppressive while the other party-the CSE-would experience it
as informal and open. These differing perceptions help to explain why advocates are perceived so differently when parents
rely on their services. For CSE members, advocates who speak
the language of rights and procedural regularity destroy the
possibility of informalism. For parents, advocates translate subjectively felt "needs" into objective bargaining counters"rights"-that can be traded for resources. They not only
speak the language of the professionals far more fluently than
the parents could, but they have sufficient facility with the legal
framework of the decisionmaking process to force the CSE to
consider the parents' bargaining position or risk a costly due
process challenge. Lawyers, in a sense, reverse the positions of
the conference participants and, by virtue of their own esoteric
knowledge system, place the educators in the position of the
disempowered "layperson." 4 For CSE members, advocates
chill and inhibit interpersonal dealings; for parents, advocates
liberate, empower, and protect the fragile interests of their
children.
Parents, we have said, seldom use or even consider using
advocates. For most parents, the differences between their
worldviews and those of the professionals remain irreconcilable, and the special education process is, by and large, an exercise in frustration and alienation. Even when parents do use
lawyers, however, the enhancement of their bargaining power
is not necessarily matched by a reconciliation of conflicting
worldviews. Although parents with an advocate are far more
likely to achieve the results they want for their children, the
transformative effects of the lawyer's involvement are interpreted differently by parents and professionals in the CSE process. The invocation of law tends to confirm disparities in the
perceptions of parents and professionals rather than to reconcile them.

VII. Beginnings
Through the unknown, remembered gate
When the last of earth left to discover
Is that which was the beginning.
-T.S. Eliot, "Little Gidding" (1952:145)
24

This insight was suggested to me by Paul Hyams.
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We have moved backward and forward in time, from narratives of "beginnings" to narratives of the present. These stories
transcend time: the "origin myths" are rich with implicit references to recent events, and the narratives of current experiences incorporate much that came before. By exploring such
stories across time, I have attempted to explain the origin
myths and to decipher their meanings.
The parents who tell these stories perceive the world in
terms of a set of oppositions that originate in the diagnosis of
their child. Before the diagnosis, some parents explained to
me, their dream was the conventional vision of a "normal"
family in a house with a white picket fence. After the diagnosis,
their vision changed. Their child was defined in opposition to
other children, their aspirations in opposition to the child's
predicted future, their wishes in opposition to the recommendations of educators and other specialists. They found themselves on the other side of a divide separating them from the
ideals and institutions of mainstream American society. The
transformation from a holistic to a divided and oppositional
consciousness is one of the most important meanings to be
found in the origin myths and is associated in the myths with
the trauma of the diagnosis itself.
If we examine these oppositions more carefully, we find
first, and most obviously, an opposition of professional and
parent. In the origin stories, the professional is a doctor. As the
child grows older, parents must deal not only with doctors but
with other professionals who specialize in evaluation and programming for children with disabilities. Some are medical specialists, some psychologists, and some educators. For the parent who tells the origin stories, the original doctor stands for
all these professionals. The stories attempt to show that the
professional does not listen to or care about the parent. The
professional, in these stories, rejects the parent's views and
emotions and speaks the cold language of science. The professional values objectivity above all else and assumes that the
parent's concerns are subjective and thus of lesser importance
than the insights of the specialist. The origin stories also show,
however, that the professional was wrong about the child. Exclusive reliance on science and rejection of the parent's common sense and intuition, these stories suggest, lead to erroneous conclusions about the child and the future. The origin
stories are meant to show that the child's accomplishments
have far exceeded the original diagnosis and that the parent's
insights have ultimately triumphed over those of the professional.
The origin stories encode other oppositions as well. The
opposition of authority and subordination versus participation-which the parents experience so vividly in the IEP con-

Narratives of Authority, Resistance, Disability, and Law

822

ference-is implicit in the mythic depiction of the medical specialist dominating the parent, who is the "victim" in the
encounter. The Campos, for example, convey this sense of
helpless victimization when they compare the delivery of the
diagnosis to being shot again and again by the doctor,2 5 and
Mary Roth and others convey their inability to participate in
interactions with professionals when they describe how the
doctors refuse to listen seriously to their concerns over the
child's development.
The origin myths thus encode a set of oppositions-professional versus parent, science versus common sense, objectivity
versus subjectivity, authority versus participation-that are relevant not only to the original diagnosis but also to the parents'
later encounters with professionals, particularly in the context
of the special education system. How should these striking parallels between stories of the past and present be explained? To
some extent, certainly, there is a projecting back of contemporary concerns onto recollections of past events. Parents emphasize certain narrative themes in the origin myths because their
more recent experiences with the special education system
have focused their attention on some aspects of the original diagnosis more than on others. This form of explanation assumes
that parents "read back" from present to past, and perceive
historical events in their lives in terms of insights and understandings they have acquired more recently.
Although this explanation addresses one aspect of the process through which historical accounts are often constructed, it
leaves other questions unanswered. If parents were somehow
able to avoid the CSE process entirely, or if their experiences
with the CSE were completely positive and harmonious, should
we assume that they would not tell the sort of origin stories discussed in this essay? That is, if there were nothing to "read
back," would their accounts of the past be dramatically different? Further, should we assume that the origin myths change
significantly as the children grow from infancy through adolescence and into adulthood? If present experiences provide a
lens for viewing the past, then stories about the past should
vary considerably with changes in the circumstances of the family over the years.
My study was not designed to address these questions. Undoubtedly myths do constantly evolve and change, but it is my
impression that the essential themes of the origin stories do
not vary fundamentally with changes in the circumstances of
their narrators. Indeed, it was the similarities of these stories as
told by so many different parents in different circumstances
that first captured my attention.
25

See the narrative quoted above at pp. 001-02.
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A somewhat different explanation for the thematic parallels
between the narratives of past and present involves a process of
"reading forward" rather than reading back. According to this
form of explanation, the original traumatic encounter with the
doctor provides a "template" that structures parents' future experiences and perceptions. The ways in which parents behave
in their later dealings with professionals and the ways in which
parents interpret these interactions are shaped by the oppositions they first encounter at the time of diagnosis.
This explanation is also persuasive in certain respects, yet
it, too, leaves certain questions unanswered. The origin myths
are told by many but not all parents. If parents were satisfied
with their doctors' handling of the initial diagnosis, should we
assume that their later perceptions of educational professionals
must also be positive? My data suggest that the contrary is true:
regardless of the nature of the initial diagnosis, parents tend to
describe their experiences with the special education system in
broadly similar terms. These similarities cannot be explained
simply in terms of a common experiential "template" that
dates back to the time of diagnosis.
Thus, I would hope to suggest an important relationship
between narratives of past and present without implying a
linkage so tight that either becomes a sine qua non for the
other. Processes of "reading back" and "reading forward" certainly occur, but neither interpretive approach fully explains
the textual relationships we have explored. A third form of explanation should also be considered, one that emphasizes the
affirmative, creative power of myth. Implicit in the retelling of
these stories is that, by doing so, the triumphant ending will be
achieved again. The myths establish a series of implied comparisons between the past event and the current situation. The internal logic of the myth implicitly compares A in the past to A I
in the present, B to B 1 , C to C1, and so forth, thus suggesting
that X (the child's triumph over the professional's negative
prognosis) will be comparable to X, (the child's triumph over
the limited expectations and programming of the professional
educators). The retelling of the myth is not only a justification
for parents to hold firm in their position on educational issues
but a way to make things happen again as they happened
before. This is, at least in part, what Eliade ([1949] 1959:74)
means when he writes that myth abolishes time and reactualizes
the cosmic order as it is figured in the mythic statement. This is
the power of the myth, the reason it is told and retold with such
intensity. The very act of retelling is a way to ensure that archetypal values and outcomes in the myth will triumph over pain,
opposition, and disorder. Some forms of prophesy are self-fulfilling.
Myth-making, in this sense of the term, offers rewards that
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differ from the benefits of law discussed in the preceding section. For a few parents, the law supplies a guarantee that right
order-as figured in the origin myth-will once again prevail.
The system within which parents and professionals meet and
bargain for the child's future is a creature of the law and is pervaded by its norms and procedures. The child's rights within
this system could thus serve as the mechanism to "reactualize"
the triumph over the professionals that is depicted in the origin
stories. Educational rights could help to resolve other oppositions as well: the incongruity of bargaining for material resources by citing personal and emotional needs, for example,
or the tension between idiosyncratic decisionmaking practices
developed by educators in each school district and the standardized practices required by the act. For some parents, we
have said, the law plays such a role. Through the intervention
of professional advocates, the wishes and concerns of the parents are converted into a currency of rights that can be traded
for resources controlled by the school district. The advocates
can also see to it that everyday decisionmaking routines of educators yield to the more regularized, legally reviewable procedures mandated by the IDEA. In this sense, legal intervention
can "actualize" the victorious outcomes prefigured in the origin stories.
Yet parents are reluctant to invoke the law-for reasons we
have already discussed-and CSE members' comments on the
involvement of lawyers in the special education process should,
in any case, caution us against concluding that a legal victory
for the parents could make their world whole again. For the
professional educators, attorney involvement is divisive and estranges the professionals from the parents. It chills relationships rather than reconciling adversaries and creates opposition where none had, in their view, existed before. Invocation
of the law may guarantee the kind of triumphant outcome that
is the subject matter of the origin myths parents like to retell,
but it may also represent no more than a temporary strategic
victory in a local skirmish. The potential benefits of law are very
great, according to the testimony of parents who have chosen
to invoke its protections. But what law cannot do is restore the
world that was shattered into oppositional categories at the
moment their child was first diagnosed. Perhaps that world can
never be recovered; perhaps the experience of its loss is an inevitable part of all human existence. Over time and with experience, the parents of children with disabilities come to understand that the work of law is to confront adversity in a divided
world while the work of myth is to transcend it.
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